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Continuity and discontinuity of East German identity 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall: A case study 
Nietzsche once commented that it is typically German to ask what it is to be German 
(McFalls 1995:143).  Interest in German identity, or “the German identity problem” 
has endured for more than a century (Gilliar 1996:20), and indeed the project of 
forming a German identity is said to have begun in the 18th century, with the 
campaign to establish a ‘cultural nation’ (Jarausch et al 1997: 42).  However long ago 
this fascination began, it is clear that the events of the autumn of 1989 have given it 
new life.  In the ten years since the unification of the two Germanies, questions about 
German identity have increasingly permeated national consciousness.  Despite the 
early optimism of many – epitomized by Willy Brandt’s now famous statement of 
November 1989, “Now grows together what belongs together” (quoted in Minkenberg 
93:53) – the challenges of unification (economic, political, social and political) 
persist.i  Even Chancellor Helmut Kohl has commented: “… inner unity … will 
admittedly take longer and cost more than most, including myself, had originally 
assumed” (quoted in Steininger 2001:27). 
 
Significantly, the passage of time has not simplified the question of national identity. 
Rather, it has prompted many, as Nietsche might have predicted, to think more deeply 
not only about what it means to be a German, but to be a German from a particular 
part of Germany.  In this chapter, I will examine the effect of the changes of 1989 on 
East Germans’ sense of their national identity.  The picture I will paint is one of 
apparent contradictions as East Germans continue to probe, explore and struggle with 





Pickel (1997) comments upon the “essentially contested” (p. 203) nature of identity, 
and describes three distinct meanings of the term.  First, and  “politically by far the 
most successful” (p. 203), is national collective identity, which is based on the 
assumption of “the nation as a natural and homogeneous whole with essential and 
unchanging characteristics, a common past and common future” (p. 203).  Second is 
the “more ‘social scientific’ conception of identity” which quantifies “measurable 
individual attitudes and value orientations” (p. 203).  Finally, there is the post-modern 
perspective which regards identity as “a great diversity of constantly changing 
meaning structures embodied in and mediated by discourse practices and codified in a 
variety of texts” (p.203).   
 
Clearly, how one conceptualises East German identity is influenced by how one 
understands the meaning of identity more broadly.  East German national collective 
identity is, in Pickel’s description, roughly equivalent to the ‘official’ East German 
identity, that is, the concept of citizenship rights and duties as propagated by the East 
German state.  The project of national-identity-building was high on the agenda of the 
socialist state, and there were a wide variety of programmes – for instance the  Free 
German Youth (FDY) and the Young Pioneers –in which individuals were virtually 
required to participate, whose explicit purpose was to instil and promote a very 
particular concept of the duties of citizenship amongst its populous.  Perhaps because 
of this, rather than despite it, many East Germans appeared to have “a fundamental 
ambivalence towards the manifest successes and failures of the East German state” 
 3 
(Jarausch et. al.1997: 41).   It was precisely this aspect of identity which had been in 
crisis long before the revolutionary changes of 1989.  At no time was this more clear 
than when East Germans went to the polls in March 1990, to participate in the first 
and only democratic elections their country would know; the resounding message was 
a rejection not only of communism, but of the East German state.  Offe (1996) 
comments upon “the total lack of GDR loyalty towards its own political existence” (p. 
22), and writes 
It turned out that the GDR had not been solidly recognized internally, that is, 
by its own people… How far the GDR had been from becoming a ‘nation’ 
through its own collective self-confidence and identity became apparent in the 
lack of a voice of its own during the process of unification (p. 23)  
 
If the ‘official’ East German national identity can be said to have been in critical 
condition before surely this was the time of its death.  
 
Paradoxically, however, this new situation created an opportunity for the revival, even 
rediscovery, of other less tangible and perhaps therefore more powerful aspects of 
East German identification.  Jarausch et al comment: “History plays a central role in 
the creation of national identity…. Groups represent their fate in stories which create 
a feeling of community by recounting their trials and tribulations” (1997:25).  The fall 
of the wall opened up new spaces for East Germans to experience their common 
history, both that which they had lived through and that which they were making.  
Times of political upheaval are particularly ripe conditions for collective narrative 
reconstruction (Roβteutscher 2000:62) and this in turn has high potential for the 
renewal of collective identity.  If, from a post-modern perspective, identity is 
fragmented, multi-layered, and in constant flux, then the quality and the complexity of 
the psychological challenges posed by the transformation of East Germany can 
perhaps be best captured by a framework which problematizes homogeneity and 
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internal consistency, and rather emphasizes the dynamic tension inherent in identity 
work.  
 
For those interested in the quantifiable aspects of identity – Pickel’s second meaning 
– statistics abound.   As a result of unification, there was massive reorganization of 
East German social structures.  Kolinksy (1995b) comments “… the collapse of state 
socialism and the integration of East Germany into the western polity had the 
hallmarks of a transformation: nothing remained unchanged, unquestioned or 
predictable” (p. 13).  Nowhere can the effects of the changes be seen more clearly 
than in the alteration in the rates of birth, marriage and divorce.   
The incorporation of the GDR into the political, social and economic system 
of the old Federal Republic has been accompanied by a series of dramatic 
changes to the pattern of family life in the five new Länder.  These changes 
have found vivid expression in the precipitous fall in the marriage, divorce and 
birth rates of around 66 per cent, 80 percent and 60 percent respectively 
between 1988 and 1992 (Dennis 1998:83). 
 
Employment – “the core of … life and the yardstick to measure all the value of all 
things and of all people” (Bauernmoral 1908, cited in Knabe 1995:71) – was severely 
effected by the changes of 1989.  In 1988, the workforce was 9.7 million (out of a 
population of 16 million); within five years, it had fallen by 5 million (Knabe 1995: 
73).  In all areas of life, the changes were most dramatic for East German women: 
under state socialism, women were “as numerous as in the labour force as men, 
enjoyed equal access to education, and were as likely as men to obtain vocational 
qualifications, although less likely to reach advanced levels anywhere” (Kolinksy 
1995c:177).  For a variety of reasons, most of this has changed in the decade since 
unification, and as a result, East German women have proven to be particularly 
vulnerable to the previously unknown phenomenon of poverty. 
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Judging from these statistics, one might assume, along with Kolinsky, that “nothing 
has remained unchanged” (1995:13), including that elusive phenomenon, East 
German identity.  However, while the scale of structural change is well-documented, 
the underlying meanings which East Germans attribute to these changes is less 
understood. Initial research into “shifts in the collective attitudes towards key policy 
issues that were triggered by the process of unification… suggest[s] both major 
changes and astounding continuities” (Jarausch 1997b:8).  Indeed, the deeper one 
probes into the effects of unification on East German identity, the less uniform the 
picture.   
 
In the first half of 1992, I was in Berlin collecting life stories from forty women and 
men who had been leaders in the citizens' movements which spearheaded the 
revolutionary changes of East Germany in 1989, or what one of my respondent’s, 
documentary film maker and later parliamentarian Konrad Weiβ, refers to as “the 
German Autumn.”  I arrived only weeks after the Stasi files had been opened to the 
public, and the general atmosphere in those grey winter months was of a very raw 
society.  Conversations about identity were commonplace - where to get one, how to 
lose one, how to find one which had been lost.  Wolfgang Herzberg, East Germany’s 
first oral historian, told me that identity had become "a fashionable word."  People of 
East Germany, he said, had "lost their old identity, which has always been a bit 
unstable.  Now they are looking for a new identity."  Major social changes had 
occurred in East Germany between the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and when I 
collected my data in 1992; writing in 1994, German historian Jurgen Kocka observed: 
"Germany has changed more in the last four years than it has in the last four decades" 
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(1994:173).  What I witnessed in the months I spent there was a revolution of memory 
and identity. In this chapter, I will explore the complex interplay between the 
continuity and discontinuity of identity as articulated in my interviews with these 
forty East Germans.  
 
‘Mauer in Kopf’ – the wall in the mind  
Reinhard Weiβhuhn is an East German who had been part of the small underground 
opposition in his country for more than twenty years when, on November 9, 1989, the 
Berlin Wall was opened.  Here he describes his reaction to this momentous event: 
This was such a … a very elementary transformation of one’s existence, of 
the… well, the total… world in a way.  I’ll try to explain. I have lived… [For 
20 years…] I have always lived 200 metres from the wall. And this wall, to 
me, has become a symbol of captivity in every respect, also in a metaphoric, 
symbolic sense.  And this is what I have been ramming my head against for 
the last 20 years. And I had… as a way of survival, I had resolved to ignore 
this wall as far as I could, you know by reason.  You see, in other words, I 
have suppressed the problem of ‘the wall’ tried to suppress it.  I tried to do the 
same throughout the week when the wall had gone.  I did not only try to 
suppress the fact that the wall had been there previously, but I also tried to 
suppress the fact that it had gone. And it didn’t work…  
 
The conversations I had with East Germans were full of descriptions of the Wall, and 
its function as an organizing principle in their lives.  Clearly, the wall was both 
physical – 45 miles long, and, at places, ten foot thick, concrete re-enforced with steel 
rods - and metaphorical. For many years, the wall was a prominent feature in the 
dreams of East Germans. Although the wall took more than two years to dismantle, its 
psychological hold is even more enduring.  
 
Wolfgang Templin, once identified by Eric Honecker as “the number one enemy of 
the state,” tells a very different story from that of Weiβhuhn above.  Although both 
men, as co-founders of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, were well 
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established figures of East Germany’s underground opposition, on the night the wall 
opened, they found themselves living on opposite sides of the wall, due to the fact of 
Templin’s forced exile to the west in 1988.  
Well, my sentiments of this night were different from those of other people, 
because I was on the wrong side of the wall… I immediately rang friends and 
said “if the wall comes down then my route back into the GDR is free,” and I 
was ecstatic… The fall of the wall for me meant that I could go back into the 
GDR rather than get out of it.  And purely physically I experienced this – 
everybody pushing past me in the opposite direction and me pushing against 
the stream the other way.  Well, I was overjoyed and it was in that mood that I 
re-entered the GDR… Two, three weeks later, we all, that is my children, my 
family, moved back here. 
 
The wall had always been something which structured one’s very existence, 
physically and psychologically. Wolfgang Ullmann, senior churchman and member of 
the Bundestag, explains “If you live beside the wall, it’s strange, untenable, and so 
unnatural.  When I took a little walk with my wife in the churchyard… you always 
had the soldiers watching you from the towers.”  Even now, the long-term 
psychological consequences of the presence of the wall for more than a quarter of a 
century are difficult to ascertain. The phrase  “the Wall in our minds,” attributed to 
West Berlin author Peter Schneider (1983), “assumes that 45 years of communist rule 
have had a profound cultural and political impact” (Klingermann and Hofferbert 
1994:38).  The phrase is now commonplace in discussions of the transition to post-
communism, and its updated version “rests on the assumption that the trend of current 
developments is toward the heightening of barriers between eastern and western 
Germany, especially as regards attitudes and behaviour”  (Klingermann and 
Hofferbert 1994:38).   Jens Reich, a senior East German biologist and key leader of 
the citizen’s movement, compares himself to his children, who, at the time of our 
interview – less than three years after the opening of the wall – were already living, 
working and studying in the west.   
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[they live] without looking any longer at that inner wall.  But for me the inner 
wall is still present… You always pass a border when you go through 
Wollenstraβe, [you] feel people are different, the unspoken. Conventions are 
different…. you don’t feel depressed in any way, but it’s different…  
 
Ironically, as the Berlin Wall came down, the inner wall - the wall which marked the 
psychological distance between eastern and western Germany - was for many 
strengthened.  Prior to 1989, East Germans had had ample exposure to West German 
culture particularly through the medium of television; however, actual contact 
between the two parts of Germany only served to highlight differences.   
 
Ruth Reinecke is an actress at the Maxim Gorki Repertoire Theatre in Berlin, and was 
one of the organizers of the November 4th demonstration in Alexanderplatz, which 
precipitated the opening of the wall five days later. She describes that time in her life 
as "difficult to analyse, because the events took place so rapidly, one was chasing the 
next.  Not only the events in the street, but the events inside the self."  As the Berlin 
Wall was opened, Reinecke was immediately aware that this would have vast 
implications, not only for the political situation in the GDR, but for her very personal 
sense of self. 
When the wall was opened, suddenly another world existed, which I did not 
know, which I would have to live in, whether I wanted it or not.  There was of 
course a great curiosity to explore the world, this still exists.  On the other 
hand I had the fear somehow whether I would be capable of making this new 
world... my own... Maybe there was also some fear that I could not stay any 
more the same person I had been so far. 
 
For Reinecke, as for Weiβhuhn, the opening of the wall had an immediate and 
profound impact on “the events inside the self.”  For her, deep personal reflection and 
change are inevitable, and this is both frightening and exciting.  One of the most 
intriguing aspects of the many conversations I had with East Germans was the extent 
to which they intimately experienced the dynamic relationship between their own 
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biography and the forces of history.  Many felt that they had helped to make history 
and that history was most definitely changing not only their life circumstances, but 
their very selves. ii   
 
National identity: Imagined community vs. real boundaries 
The events of and subsequent to that autumn caused many East Germans to re-
evaluate their relationship to their country.  Ruth Reinecke explains to me:  
I believe for myself the GDR has left behind a very decisive influence on my 
life which cannot be extinguished.   On the other hand I believe that I am still 
at an age in which I can actively cope with the new things which have come. 
Certain things I cannot lose, nor do I want to lose.  I do not want to extinguish 
my life, my former life as a citizen of the GDR.  
 
Reinecke’s phrase “my life, my former life as a citizen of the GDR” reveals an 
ambivalence towards this aspect of her identity which is also evident in other 
interviews.  Is she still East German, or is she not? 
 
One of the questions I asked in my interviews was "When you are asked where are 
you from, what do you say?"  Most interview participants paused over their response, 
but eventually gave some form of the answer "the GDR" - in the present tense, with 
comments such as "throughout my life I will remain a citizen of the GDR." 
(Variations on this included one respondent describing himself as “coming from the 
east of Germany” and another saying she was from “the other Germany.”)  Several 
respondents said they did not feel German at all, but rather European.  Virtually no 
one responded that they felt they were from “Germany.”iii  This question provoked a 
strong response from Jens Reich:  
I am from the GDR. I've lived in the GDR, I was brought up in the GDR. I've 
no misgivings of any sort in saying it. I never use the word ehemalig [former, 
as in the former GDR"]... I find it ridiculous. The GDR is a fact, an historical 
fact.  You don't say the ehemalig German Reich; it [simply] doesn't exist any 
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longer... This emphasis on ehemalig and on the disassociation of yourself from 
it ... is a sign of psychic instability in those people [who use this word.]  
 
 Later in the interview, Reich elaborates further on this point:  
I've no inner drive to deny the GDR...[which] has proven its right of historical 
existence in '89. By our own activity we freed ourselves and made it a decent 
society, for some weeks and some months. We did it at least, so ... without any 
feeling of shame you can say "[I am from the] GDR.” 
 
Sebastian Pflugbeil, is a physicist and leading environmentalist who, along with Reich 
and twenty-eight others, was a founder member of Neus Forum, the first and most 
significant of the citizen’s groups to form in Autumn 1989.  While he shares with 
Reich a deep sense of national pride surrounding the events of the bloodless 
revolution, his overall outlook is far more pessimistic.    
Compared to Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, our national consciousness 
was very underdeveloped or non-existent… [we] were not at all proud of our 
history or …proud of being a GDR citizen. Then, in the autumn of ’89, within 
a few days, [we developed] a very strong, extremely strong, extremely 
pronounced national identity… But that lasted exactly until the night the wall 
came down.  In the autumn of  ’89 this was a positive identity, a constructive, 
national identity.  Now it has more the appearance of a hospital community… 
 
Michael Passauer is a pastor, and served a vital role providing a safe place of harbour 
for dissident East Germans during the 1980s.  He is very interested in the problem of 
identity, and notes marked changes which have occurred as a result of political events.  
Like Pflugbeil, he explains that citizens of the GDR had always had “problems with 
identity.” 
He [the East German citizen] had a hard time to say “I am German” – it is 
associated with, for instance, the Third Reich… but he also didn’t say “I am a 
GDR citizen.” That’s not a possible thing to identify with. So he was 
permanently in search for an identity.  In Autumn ’89 … the GDR citizen for 
the first time identified himself very closely (“skinclose”) with the GDR…. 
“We are the people.” This we had for about half a year, and this we, I 
experienced. … we had this strong self-confidence, we were able to break 
down totalitarian systems.  And with October 3rd [the day unification took 
effect], there is a new identity crisis. 
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Passuer outlines a collective psychological journey which resonates with the 
descriptions offered by other respondents.  Until 1989, the historical moment of self-
determination, East Germans were “vague” about their heimat, where they belonged 
and what was their home.  Both Pflugbeil and Passauer note the lack of identification 
between East Germans and their state.  This was “not something they felt proud of;” 
for reasons of history and circumstance, the German Democratic Republic was “not 
possible to identify with,” as discussed earlier.  All this changed with the bloodless 
revolution, when the citizens of the GDR “proved [their country’s] right of historical 
existence.”  But that sense of national identity, so heightened by these political events, 
would take different forms following unification. 
 
Resisting Identity Appropriation 
Initially, many East Germans reacted to the changes of 1989 by moving to the west, 
seeking to become as fully integrated into that society as possible. Andre Brie, Deputy 
Chairperson of the Party of Democratic Socialism (the remake of the old Communist 
Party), told me he felt  that East Germans had been "forced into the West German 
identity" whereas he "would have preferred to come to a new identity... I think 
millions of East Germans are living at the moment as if they have no past."iv   
Henning Shaller, set designer for the Maxim Gorki Theatre in Berlin and one of the 
key organizers for the November 4th demonstration in Alexanderplatz, echoes some of 
these sentiments.  For him, there is a critical connection between national identity and 
a consciousness of history, and he too expresses concern about living as if one had no 
past. “This process of rapid unification,” he explains,  
…led to a loss of identity, because everything which still reminds us of the old 
structures of the GDR is destroyed. It is difficult for people now to have their 
own identity. Identity in a way I believe is related to the consciousness of 
history. But if I ignore history, or deal with history in a selective way saying 
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“well I will not bear in mind this and this here,” then I won't have an identity.  
It cannot be denied that a great part of my life developed in this somewhat 
rotten state.  But I can't say that everything I have done was bad, and I observe 
this great fear that people who are living here in this part of Germany within 
the shortest time have been taken over by a new identity which may be fatal in 
its consequences. 
 
Bärbel Bohley, the so-called "mother of the revolution,"v shares Brie's assessment.  
She explains "some people do not want to profess their identity, they feel second class 
citizens compared to the West Germans, so they say they are German."  (Bohley’s 
description does not apply to most of the respondents in my student who had  always 
been and continued to be unusual East German citizens.vi).    She expands on this: 
I think that there is an East German identity, and there are those that accept it 
and those that reject it.  But it does exist. And even this rejection is a way of 
distancing oneself from it, of saying 'farewell.'  We have lived here for forty 
years, and you cannot deny that.  One can say ten times one is German, but 
Germany did not exist. There was the Federal Republic and there was the 
GDR and this formed the West Germans and the East Germans.   
 
One example of trying to say “farewell”, of living as if one had no past, is reported by 
Naimark, who tells of an interview with a twenty-two year old punkfrau from the 
GDR. Six months after having moved to West Germany, she was asked “Why did you 
leave the GDR?” “The GDR? Never heard of it” (1992:87).vii   
 
A one-line comment such as this has clarity and finality which a more in-depth 
conversation might lack.  In Naimark’s account, the reader is not given any 
information about the context in which the exchange occurred, who the  young 
woman perceived herself as speaking to, and in whose presence. Moreover, one has 
no sense of her identity over time. Ten years later, how would she answer the same 
question.  The more researchers probe questions of identity, the more complex the 
picture which emerges. 
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In 1994, Jennifer Yoder conducted a study interviewing elite parliamentarians in 
Brandenburg. When asked whether a particular eastern German identity exists, 
slightly more than half (ten out of eighteen) responded positively. Follow-up 
questions, however, evoked responses that revealed a distinct “eastern” dimension in 
terms of elites’ self identification. Typical of the responses she found were the 
following: 
 
I will remain an East German in this [political rebuilding] process.  I have a 
different political culture. I try to bring a different politics over… [I]nstead of 
making people feel indebted [to the West], hesitant to be active, I have to 
encourage them to assert their own voices (SPD member, Potsdam, May 1994) 
 
But what exactly is meant by an “East German identity”?  For one of Yoder’s 
respondents, it means simply having had “a common history, experiences, life 
relationships, upbringing, schooling, work world… and these have formed people in a 
special way” (1999:135) and for another, it indicates “[e]xperience under the wall and 
a particular socialization pattern” (1999:136).  Yoder states that “the most common 
identification may be summed up as ‘East Germans in a united Germany’” – an 
identity which some interviewees referred to as “the eastern biography” (Yoder 1999: 
136). 
 
A revitalized identity? 
However, with the growing realization of the appreciable differences between eastern 
and western Germany, noted by Bohley and others, there has been a movement 
towards a new grassroots post-communist eastern identity (Hogwood 2000).  Bohley 
herself comments upon those East Germans who “are very conscious of the fact that 
they have lived under extraordinary conditions and have had very special experiences 
and they are proud of it.”  In 1990, 66% of East Germans identified themselves as 
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more German than East German, whereas by 1995, this figure had dropped to only 
34%.  Correspondingly, in 1990 28% identified themselves as more East German than 
German, while in 1995, this figure had climbed to 60% (Yoder 1999:204-205).  As 
Yoder explains, “a discovery of … differences [between East and West German 
societies] led to a rediscovery of separate identities” (1999:205).  
 
Yoder summarizes the revitalized appeal to a distinctive eastern identity: 
… eastern identity has been rediscovered as a response to the encroachment of 
west German norms and rules for behaviour and the devaluation of eastern 
culture and identity. This rediscovery can also be interpreted as a positive/ 
proactive development … a process of self-assertion, an expression of pride 
and autonomy, and a recognition that the east was and is different from the 
west (1999:209). 
 
Wiesenthal’s (1998) analysis of the revival of eastern identity is more wholly reactive 
than that suggested by Yoder.  Widespread post-unification dissatisfaction (PUD) 
experienced by many East Germans can be explained, at least partially, by the 
“treatment-response thesis.”  While before unification, East Germans may have felt 
themselves to be very similar in terms of values and cultural patterns,  
the experience of western supremacy gave way to a process of increasing 
cultural differentiation.  Feeling labelled as more naïve, less professional, less 
competent, and culturally outdated, east Germans would appear to be lining up 
for a counter-attack.  They remind themselves of ‘their’, up to now, not so 
deeply held ‘socialist’ and ‘communist’ values and confront ‘the west’ by 
claiming allegiance to a revived east German collective identity … [which is 
seen to embody] ‘true’ values of egalitarianism, modesty, solidarity, social 
security and stability… (1998:17). 
 
Ursel Herzberg, in her seventies, expresses views compatible with the “treatment 
response thesis.”  Speaking from her own experience and that of others she knows, 
she comments:  
I think that people have acquired an East German identity after the changes 
more than they had before. Before that they were very dissatisfied with many 
things in this part of Germany that was called GDR, but now they feel quite 
different… Now they feel that they are East Germans, or ex-GDR citizens, 
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much more than they did before, I think.  So do I…. People feel East German, 
also because a lot of the West Germans treat them with some arrogance, with a 
lot of arrogance in fact… therefore, East German people feel they have to 
emphasize their identity again, sort of regain their self-respect. 
 
As a result of unification, some East Germans felt that they had become, as Werner 
Fischer described it to me “an alien in my own country.”  Bärbel Bohley expresses a 
similar sentiment: “… we were annexed in a way. We emigrated to the Federal 
Republic in our entirety… against my will… the West came to me.”  East German 
author Christ Wolf describes "the manner and the speed with which everything 
connected with the GDR was liquidated, considered suspect" and views herself and 
her fellow citizens as being "housed in a barracks under quarantine, infected with 
Stasi virus" (1997:241). This context makes ripe breeding ground for a siege 
mentality, in which self-identification is primarily reactive, and in this case at least, 
retrospective, a “counter-identity” as Roβteutscher describes it (2000:74).  But such 
an unstable foundation does not bear well for long-term identity maintenance. 
 
Why was it easier for East Germans to embrace an East German identity only after the 
demise of East Germany? Historically, East German national identity was primarily 
reactive, existing in relation to the West in general and to West Germany in particular.  
As Sebastian Pflugbeil commented earlier, in contrast to other Eastern bloc countries 
with hundreds of years of history behind them, East Germany was an artificial 
creation; as such, national identity had never been very strong.  But another kind of 
GDR identity did exist “within the dominant culture … [which] developed in at least 
partial opposition to the official culture” (McFalls 1995:148).  It is this aspect of 
national identity which became revitalized after unification. 
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Benedict Anderson (1983) has written of the nation as an imagined community.viii  If 
one applies this definition to the case of East Germany, one can begin to decipher why 
the dissolution of the actual country created a new psychological space for national 
identity.  As the parliamentarians in Yoder’s study quoted above explained, the new 
eastern biography is based upon a sense of a shared community, and a common 
experience of life under the wall.  It is not surprising that this could be best 
appreciated when in comparison to something else, in this case, with West Germany.  
Hogwood (2000) describes four distinctive expressions of eastern German identity 
which have developed over the last decade: 1) third-way socialism; 2) the 
‘Trotzidentität’ (identity of contrariness); 3) ‘(N)Ostalgia’(nostalgia for the East 
Germany of the past), and 4) ‘Ossi’ pride.  It is the last of these which Hogwood sees 
has having “the greatest potential to sustain itself as a live and lasting expression of 
separate easternness with a united Germany” (2000:45). 
 
Ultimately, how enduring will eastern identity prove to be?  Will Germans living in 
the new Länder continue to experience, if indeed they still do, a “hospital community” 
ethos?   How long is the life of the “Stasi virus”?  Will Ossi pride subside with 
increased integration between east and west?   If much of the revived sense of eastern 
biography is founded on “the memory of shared experiences within the social 
structures of divided Germany” then will this phenomenon “be limited to the 
generations born in the aftermath of the Second World War” (Hogwood 2000:64-65), 
or will these memories survive in the form of cultural narratives, to be transmitted 
from one generation to the next?  Writing more than a decade after unification, 
Hogwood warns “…it is not possible to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to whether 
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a distinct eastern identity will prove to be merely transitional, or will become a lasting 
German subculture” (2000:64).  
 
East Germany: ‘Model case for Transformation Theory’? 
The term “transformation” has been widely used to describe the ongoing changes 
which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989.  Indeed, while the 
term is pervasive in the academic discourse on these political events, the assumptions 
upon which it rests have been rarely analysed.  Kupferberg identifies a cluster of 
issues associated with the transformation paradigm: 
• Why did communism collapse the way it did? 
• How should we craft stable democracies in societies lacking the 
preconditions of democracy? 
• What is the possible role of the West in assisting the East European 
societies to create market economy conditions, assumed to be 
necessary for stable democracies? 
• What is the relationship between democratisation and nation building? 
• Which geo political strategies will be pursued by Western democracies 
seeking to establish new security and trade arrangements with the 
highly volatile societies of Eastern Europe? (Kupferberg 1999:129-
130). 
 
Implicit in the issues listed here are a set of assumptions which evade scrutiny. By 
definition, ‘transformation’ focuses the mind on change: a is transformed into b, and 
in the process a ceases to exist.   The transformation process explores not the complex 
and ongoing interplay between a and b, but rather how to ensure that b will most 
closely resemble c.  Notably, the transformation paradigm is clearly located in the 
standpoint of a powerful outsider. 
 
 
Kupferberg (1999) has suggested that East Germany might be the “model case” for 
existing theories of transformation (pp.129-148).  While noting East Germany’s 
“marginal and somewhat ambiguous role” in the literature on transformation in 
 18 
Eastern Europe, Kupferberg argues that the unique historical circumstances relating to 
both the creation and demise of East Germany make it ideal for exploring this 
theoretical paradigm. It is, Kupferberg argues, a Sonderweg, or a particular case of 
transformation, a view echoed by Weiesenthal who labels it a “unique case of societal 
transformation” (1995:49).  Offe (1996) highlights the importance of external forces 
in the GDR’s process of transformation: “… the GDR’s case had less to do with a 
transformation ‘from above’ or ‘from below’ and more with a change ‘from outside’” 
(p. 148).  Expanding on the implications of this, Kupferberg argues: 
… the objectively favourable conditions of the transition have made it 
subjectively more painful than in other transitional countries… By virtue of 
the fact that the GDR was transformed by positive legal fiat and ‘from 
outside’, its population was neither given the chance nor challenged to make 
its own, morally discerning contribution towards shaping its own future… 
Only in the case of Germany is the subject of transformation not identical with 
the object thereof  (1996:152). 
 
In the past decade, it is clear that East Germans have confronted a different set of 
psychological issues than their other Eastern European counterparts.  Ossi pride and 
(N)ostalgia only make sense in the context of a united, but still divided, Germany.  As 
challenging as East Germans may have found life since the revolutionary changes, 
Wiesenthal (1995) argues that in fact they have been “cushioned from the full force of 
the transformation to a market economy” (p. 49); “transformation by unification” 
(p.69) has allowed East Germans a comparatively smooth, gradual adjustment, as 
compared to the “shock therapy” experienced by other former communist countries. 
However, the important argument of the “special case” status of East Germany 




One of the most thought-provoking pieces of research challenging the assumption of 
the transformation paradigm has come from a group of Czech sociologists who have 
developed a methodology of collective autobiography, called “Ourselves’ selves,” to 
document the experiences of change and continuity in their lives and those with 
whom they live.  They write: 
The dominant rhetoric of discontinuity sat uncomfortably with our own 
experiences and observations. This is why, from the very beginning, we were 
fascinated most of all by everything that clearly did not transform (Konopasek 
with Andrews 2000:98).  
 
These researchers argue that the very concept of transformation is built upon a 
“conceptual purification of a given ‘past,’ which is put in radical opposition to some 
equally purified ‘present.’”  Rather than serving as a temporal bridge, it “disconnects 
and isolates” the past, present and future.  By only asking about what has changed, 
one loses sight of all that has remained constant. A close examination of “individual 
people, their fates and everyday lives” revealed in their research  
a far greater continuity, closeness, and temporal reversibility between the 
"socialist" then and the "transforming" now than we ourselves had expected. 
The complete break with the past, in the name of the Great Transformation in 
the East, is simply not taking place. …The very concept of transformation is 
therefore an attempt to break away radically and totally from the past… The 
world has simply changed …we belong to an essentially different time… a 
different world, which is, in fact, incommensurable with the past one. We are, 
we are told, a post-communist society (Konopasek with Andrews 2000:98-99). 
 
One of the interesting implications of this argument is that assumptions of 
discontinuity with the socialist past, the Great Transforming Society, as it is ironically 
called, has important and disturbing personal and political consequences.  If the 
present is wholly unconnected to the past, then prospects for western triumphalism are 
greatly enhanced.  But from the perspective of those who helped to create and who are 
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living through these changes, such triumphalism is entirely inappropriate. As Bärbel 
Bohley comments: 
… it [the events of 1989] was simply the revolt of the humiliated people.  And 
they did not ask why they revolted, for capitalism or socialism. They were 
simply fed up to live with this lie… Most certainly people did not go into the 
street and shout ‘we want capitalism.’ Deep down they wanted… [to] change 
their living conditions… it was not a victory for capitalism. 
 
 The transformation model, with its bipolarities between then and now, between 
communism and capitalism, influences what kind of data is gathered and how it is 
analysed.  We as western researchers in the east expect to find profoundly changed 
selves; when those who participate in our research do not produce the responses 
which we expect, we think they have not fully understood the questions we have 
posed, or attribute the absence of change to the (still-existing) power of living under 
an authoritarian regimeix (Andrews 1995, 2000). Rarely, if ever, do we challenge our 
own assumptions.  Because of the power of the transformation paradigm, it is difficult 
for us to imagine that the momentous events both inside and outside of the self might 
have been accompanied by an equally powerful and enduring sense of continuity.   
 
However, my interviews with East Germans disclose a similar story to that depicted 
by the Czech sociologists: in-depth investigations into individual lives reveal a 
continuity of self co-existing with a profound sense of personal and political change. 
Ruth Reinecke comments “The GDR citizen inside myself will always accompany the 
movements which will take place in my life.”  I asked writer and activist Freya Klier 
– who, in 1988, had been expelled to West Germany, where she continued to live at 
the time of our interview – where she felt she was from. Similar to Reinecke, she 
responds: 
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From the GDR, of course… I lived there for 38 years, it was the most 
important time of my life… it was a very intensive time, and it is my 
identity… Now a new piece of identity has been added [but] the other thing is 
still existing… The meaning of my life does not depend on the country I live 
in.  I did not change when I came to this part… 
Klier and Reinecke minimize neither the degree nor the importance of the changes 
around and within themselves, but for them, identity is an additive, not substitutive, 
phenomenon. 
 
There is an awkward moment in my interview with Bärbel Bohley, in which I ask the 
rather leading question: “Has there been a shift in the general consciousness of what it 
means to be East German?”  Bohley clearly bristles, and ultimately responds:  
 
I think it [my question] is too simple.  Probably you now want to hear, “we 
have had our experiences with a dictatorship and in the Federal Republic they 
have had their experiences with democracy,” but this is too simple. In my 
view the experiences under a democracy are not so different from those made 
under a dictatorship.  Personal courage is always difficult, to keep one's chin 
up, to assert oneself, well... to stay honest.  These are human experiences and 
it's those that are important for me.  I made them against the background of a 
dictatorship and others made them against the background of democracy. 
Insofar these human experiences are much more important for me than any 
psychological analyses. …Well, this is too complicated for me that I could 
answer that in a simple way. 
 
Bohley rejects my question as being too simplistic, built upon naïve assumptions 
regarding all that has changed in her world, both inside and out.  For her, the most 
important human qualities, such as courage and honesty, are transcendent.  
Concluding our interview, I ask her if there is anything which, in retrospect, she 
wishes she had done differently.  She rejects the “othering” which she feels is implicit 
in my question: “I would do many things differently,” she responds, “wouldn’t you?”  
Answering in this way, Bohley emphasizes our common humanity and rejects the 
bipolarism which she feels is inherent in the questions I ask her. 
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Undeniably, the events of the German autumn have precipitated profound 
psychological change for East Germans, but importantly, this change has occurred 
within a relative constancy of identity.  As MP Ingrid Koppe comments to me “…the 
past ... is not as past as we assume.  We are the result of the past and the past is in us.”  
The more micro the analysis, the less unequivocal the evidence of discontinuity.  
Human beings are, by our nature, forever in the process of becoming; there is an 
ongoing relationship between who we have been, who we are, and who we will be. As 
researchers of identity, our frameworks of analysis must seek to capture this complex 
interplay between change and consistency which characterizes our lives and the lives 
of others as they struggle to meet the challenges of the new societies they are helping 
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Endnotes  
                                                
i Less than a year later, on the day of the completion of Germany unity, Brandt moderated his earlier 
statement: “Today I would say that what politically belongs together from this 3rd of October onward 
still has to grow together” (cited in Minkenberg 1993:53). 
 
ii Because state socialism did not permit public political debate, the arts had a heightened role as a 
forum for political expression.  Performing, and even attending theatre became increasingly political 
engagements; the shows, often embodying controversial themes, were always followed by discussions 
between audience and actors. Many theatre people, including Ruth Reinecke, were key in helping to 
organize the demonstration which took place on November 4th, 1989. Reinecke herself had to leave 
Alexanderplatz at midday, for her afternoon performance.  She describes the atmosphere backstage that 
day as electric; actors, when they were not on stage, sat huddled by transistor radios following the 
events at the demonstration.  Rarely have life and art more simultaneously mirrored one another.   
 
iii The one exception to this was Wolfgang Ullmann, whose attitude towards the changes was unusual 
in my study.  He comments to me: “ It’s not the end of my country, it’s the end of this state of 
despotism and party governorship…. It was an awakening and revival of my country. (Q: So you don’t 
really feel now that you lost your country?) No, absolutely not, I got it back.” 
  
iv Interestingly, since the early 1990s, the PDS has enjoyed increasing voter popularity.  As noted by 
Kupferberg (1999) “Ideological loyalty to the previous regime… has not disappeared.  In particular the 
professionals and young people with higher education tend to support the… PDS” (p. 145). As 
Wiesenthal comments that “… many east Germans… appear to be on their way to becoming what they 
never were before: true believers in democratic socialism” (1998:17). 
 
v Bohley herself detests this label, and comments “I find the phrase ‘mother of the revolution’ stupid. 
Only men could have invented such a phrase.  They needed it as a media hype, but I find it absolutely 
idiotic.“ 
 
vi Leaders of East Germany’s opposition were virtually uniform in their disappointment with the 
ultimate outcome of the events of 1989. Werner Fischer captures the feelings of many:  
 
… my roots were here [in the GDR], … I had become firmly rooted to this soil, were was the 
friction that sparked controversy. I did not want to see the DGR disappear. This is how many 
opposition members express it today:  ‘better to have stormy relationship than none at all.’ 
  
 (For an elaboration of this argument see Andrews 1998.) 
 
vii After the demise of the East German state, there were strong incentives for individuals to recast 
their experiences under state socialism.  East German sociologist Marianne Schultz ironically 
comments that of the East German population of 16 million, there were 16 million who claimed to have 
been resistance fighters, as well as 16 million who portrayed themselves as victims (Andrews 
2000:184). 
 
viii For a very stimulating discussion on the relationship between imagination and national identity, 
see also Reicher and Hopkins (2001). 
 
ix Ilse Schiel, a staff member of the memoir section of the old Communist Party, describes her job as 
“refreshing the memory of the author, strengthening his ability to remember, and steering [that ability] 
in the direction appropriate for the topic” (cited in Epstein 1999: 187-188). This description of the 
guiding of memory could similarly be applied to some of the research discussed here.   
